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Summary 
 
This paper surveys the literature on monetary policy at the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates. Certain crucial insights regarding expectations have been neglected in 
recent research in this field. Taking this into account, the interactions between demand, 
confidence and supply shocks appear crucial for hitting the zero lower bound and 
escaping from it. Restoring confidence can play a vital role in solving the zero lower 
bound problem, thereby avoiding a liquidity trap. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, inflation in the industrialised world has fallen from the high 
levels reached in the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation waves occurred following 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and two large oil price shocks. According 
to IMF statistics, average year-on-year CPI-inflation in OECD countries declined from 
12% in 1980 to 5.0% in 1990, and 1.4% in 1999 (Figure 1). The variability of inflation 
in terms of standard deviations has also decreased over these years. A new era seems to 
have emerged with low and more or less stable inflation rates in the major capitalist 
economies (Clarida et al. (1998), Viñals (2001)).1 This situation is comfortable from the 
point of view of monetary policy, the overriding objective of which is price stability. In 
the words of Greenspan (1989), price stability is defined to mean “that expected 
changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not 
materially enter business and household financial decisions”. 
 
Figure 1        Consumer price inflation in advanced economies 
 
 
 
                                                           
1  In 1995, the leading monetary authorities of the world also expressed this view. At a 
meeting of the Group of Seven in October 1995, the communiqué concluded: “The 
ministers and central bank governors agreed that in most countries the conditions for 
continued growth and employment gains are in place and inflation is well under control.” 
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However, the achievement of price stability has not created a new Utopia for monetary 
policy. Instead, it has brought about new challenges (e.g. IMF (1999)). One of the main 
challenges is the decrease in the room for manoeuvre for monetary policy.2,3 The fall in 
the inflation rate in the advanced economies has coincided with a decline in the 
monetary policy interest rates (Figure 2).4  
 
Figure 2       Monetary policy interest rates 
 
The point is that – assuming zero storing costs for cash and perfect substitutability 
between non-monetary assets – nominal interest rates cannot go negative. In that case, 
the rate of return on cash (zero) dominates that on assets yielding a negative nominal 
return. In practice, nominal interest rates on (short-term) financial claims can be slightly 
negative if the cost of storing currency exceeds that of storing other claims (McCallum 
                                                           
2  Vickrey (1954) argued against policies resulting in very low inflation or deflation. 
Deflation would prevent monetary policy from engineering negative ex ante real interest 
rates, which can be necessary for correcting downward tendencies in the economy. 
3  Another challenge is analysed by Akerlof et al. (1996). They have focussed on the 
existence of downward rigidities that would favour the central bank having a small but 
positive inflation rate objective. 
4  For an historic account of (the volatility of) inflation and interest rates, see McFarlane 
and Mortimer-Lee (1994) and Homer (1977) respectively. 
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(2000)), although exceptions to the lower zero bound have been rare.5 Since for 
theoretical discussions the exact level of the floor to nominal interest rates does not 
matter, I assume for simplicity that nominal interest rates cannot go negative. In this 
context, the so-called problem of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is that 
the monetary authority is no longer in a position to pursue a policy of monetary easing 
by lowering nominal interest rates.6 Under these circumstances, monetary policy may 
still be effective via other transmission channels than nominal interest rates. For 
instance, inflationary expectations can be fuelled via higher money growth. In this 
paper, I follow Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2000) in their definition of a liquidity trap.7 
An economy is said to be in a liquidity trap if all channels of monetary transmission are 
blocked. Only in one case, the liquidity trap and the zero bound on nominal interest 
rates are identical concepts. This applies if the nominal interest is the only monetary 
transmission channel. In other cases, a binding zero lower bound is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the liquidity trap to prevail. 
 
The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates has long been regarded as a 
phenomenon of the past. It has been related mainly to the Great Depression in the US 
(1929-1930s). The main monetary policy rate in the US by then, the three months ‘T-
bill’ rate, was close to zero from 1932 onwards; it did not exceed 1% until 1948. The 
long-term interest rate was also very low in this period. It has been suggested that 
monetary policy was completely ineffective by then, i.e. that a liquidity trap prevailed.8 
The only example of a binding zero lower bound in the period between the Great 
                                                           
5  One recent example is the occurrence of slightly negative interest rates on Japanese 
short-term government bonds and some interbank lending in late 1998. Longer ago, in 
1978, the Swiss authorities imposed negative interest rates on foreign deposits in order to 
fight speculative buying of the Swiss franc. During the Great Depression US T-bills 
occasionally gave a small negative yield in the context of exemption from personal 
property taxes in some States (Cecchetti (1988)). 
6  In such circumstances, monetary easing is said to be like “pushing on a string”. This 
expression is attributed to Fed governor Marriner S. Eccles in 1935. 
7  In between these extreme positions on the interpretation of a liquidity trap, there exists a 
large range of slightly different interpretations of the liquidity trap. Since they all share 
common features, these differences are of limited importance to our discussion of the 
liquidity trap. For a detailed discussion of different interpretations, see Patinkin (1965, 
1974) and Beranek and Timberlake (1987). 
8   In the 1960s and 1970s, there was an intensive, but inconclusive, debate on whether the 
US economy was in a liquidity trap during the years of the Great Depression. This debate 
focussed on the interest elasticity of the money demand function. Some authors found 
that the interest elasticity was without limit when the short-term nominal interest rate 
approached zero. Therefore, they concluded that the economy was in a liquidity trap  
(Eisner (1963 and 1971), Spitzer (1976)); others found a fixed interest elasticity and 
came to the opposite conclusion (Bronfenbrenner and Mayer (1960 and 1963), Meltzer 
(1963)). 
  10 
Depression and the 1990s is Switzerland. In the late 1970s, Switzerland went through 
periods with nominal interest rates at or close to the zero lower bound. However, in 
contrast to the US during the Depression years, the Swiss economy was buoyant in the 
late 1970s. The very low Swiss rates have been associated with the liberalisation of 
global exchange rates in the early 1970s, although the introduction by the Swiss 
authorities of capital controls also played a role (Mauro (1995)). The new exchange rate 
regime implied appreciation and expectations of further appreciation of the Swiss franc.  
 
Developments in Japan in the late 1990s have revived interest in the zero lower bound 
phenomenon. From February 1999 to January 2002 (completion of this paper), the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate was virtually zero.9 Like the US economy during the 
Depression years, Japan has been characterised by a substantial output gap since the 
early 1990s.10 The level of potential real economic growth is estimated to be around 1% 
(OECD (2000)). Given that potential growth in other large economies is generally 
estimated to be considerably higher11, it follows that even in steady state (i.e. output gap 
closed) the Japanese real long-term interest rate will be relatively low. Assuming 
identical risk and term premia across countries, this will go hand in hand with relatively 
low short-term nominal interest rates. The Japanese example illustrates that a zero lower 
bound can emerge in a modern capitalist economy. Krugman (1998, 1999b) and 
Svensson (2000) have warned explicitly that such a situation might also prevail in the 
US and the euro area, given the structural decline in nominal interest rates over the last 
two decades. 
 
This paper surveys the literature on the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and 
the related phenomenon of the liquidity trap. Section 2 sketches the main issues in the 
framework of a New-Keynesian model, which is a dynamic stochastic real business 
cycle model with nominal rigidities. Section 3 offers an appraisal of the four main 
strands in the literature. As it turns out, these theories are incomplete. In the concluding 
section 4, I argue that certain crucial insights got lost in the literature. This pertains in 
particular to expectations, which were totally left out in the static ISLM representation 
of a macroeconomy by Hicks (1937) to return only partly in later work. It appears that 
supply factors that undermine confidence are depressing total demand in a situation 
with a binding zero lower bound. Hence, a lack of confidence is the main force driving 
                                                           
9  Until March 19, 2001, the uncollateralized overnight call rate was the direct operational 
target of the Bank of Japan. From then onward, the operational target has been the 
outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank of Japan, with the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate determined in the market. 
10  According to the OECD (2000), Japan’s output gap in 1999 is 4.0% of GDP. Applying 
Okun’s law, Krugman (1998) concludes that Japan’s output gap is even higher, in the 
order of 10%. 
11  The OECD (2000) projects potential real growth in 2000 at 1.2% in Japan, 3.7% in the 
US and 2.4% in the euro area. 
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the emergence of a liquidity trap; similarly, restoring confidence is the main challenge 
in escaping from it.  
 
 
2. The Consensus Model 
 
The zero lower bound on nominal rates was recognised as early as 1896 by Irving 
Fisher (1896). However, Keynes (1936) was the first to elaborate on the problem of the 
liquidity trap12 in Chapters 15 and 17 of The General Theory (see also Lerner (1952) 
and Ono (1994)). He emphasises the liquidity preference of economic agents, implying 
that the utility of holding money is always positive, even if more money is held than 
required by the transactions or precautionary motive (compare Modigliani (1944)). 
Keynes shows that a liquidity trap can emerge in an environment with liquidity 
preference and sluggish price adjustment. The basic idea is that an economic agent 
allocates his income to consumption, money holdings and bonds, assuming that all 
assets other than money are perfect substitutes for each other. Under normal 
circumstances, optimising behaviour will equalise the marginal rate of substitution 
between present and future consumption ((intertemporal) time preference rate), the 
marginal rate between present consumption and present money holdings (liquidity 
premium), and the nominal market interest rate. However, if the nominal market interest 
rate is below the liquidity premium, economic agents will keep consumption below the 
market clearing level. Persistent stagnation will occur, because economic agents will not 
be satiated with money, no matter how much they have accumulated. Liquidity 
preference prevails because of the speculative motive, based on uncertainty about future 
economic developments in general, and more specifically, about future nominal interest 
rates. If the long-term nominal interest rate is perceived to be very low (in the order of 
2% according to Keynes (1936)), economic agents will expect this rate to rise and will 
hold liquid assets (money) in an attempt to benefit from it. In Keynes’ (1936) view, 
money’s role as a store of wealth is the reason that “changing views about the future are 
capable of influencing the present situation”. With the market interest rate below the 
liquidity premium, consumption remains insufficient to restore market equilibrium, and 
money becomes a “bottomless sink for purchasing power”. The economy is then said to 
be in a liquidity trap. In Keynes’ (1936, page 207) own words: 
“There is the possibility […] that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, 
liquidity preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone 
                                                           
12  The liquidity trap as described by Keynes differs from the usual textbook description. 
The latter is based on Hicks’ (1937) representation of a Keynesian economy in the 
famous ISLM framework. Hicks left out the intertemporal choice completely and put the 
economy in a static framework, thereby focussing on intratemporal choices that are key 
in Keynes (1936). In a one-period model, there is no role to play for (a change in) 
expectations. Hicks was well aware of the limitations of his simplification. He himself 
noted that the assumption of given expectations is not realistic. 
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prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In this event the 
monetary authority would have lost effective control over the rate of interest.” 
 
The classical economist Pigou (1943, 1947) disagreed with Keynes on this conclusion. 
In his view, the utility of money is satiable, meaning that ultimately the liquidity 
premium will decline sufficiently to reach the time preference rate when liquidity 
holdings increase.13 In this view, rational economic agents will ultimately spend their 
cash holdings. The basic idea behind the mechanism that will restore equilibrium is the 
following. Eonomic agents realise that monetary growth will ultimately imply higher 
inflation (Fisher identity) and that future inflation will reduce their spending capacity. 
Hence, they have a strong incentive – at least in the long run – to spend before others 
do. If the time preference rate at the market clearing level is lower than the liquidity 
premium, economic agents will reduce consumption. This will imply disequilibrium in 
the goods market, and therefore generate deflation. As a result, real balances will rise 
over time, which will raise consumption until equilibrium is restored. This is the so-
called Pigou effect.  
 
By now, a consensus model has emerged to study the zero lower bound. In the long run, 
market clearing and the Pigou effect are generally believed to restore full employment 
equilibrium. Ultimately, there are no nominal rigidities and money is neutral. Hence, 
monetary policy has no real economic effects in the long run, and a liquidity trap is 
inconceivable as a persistent phenomenon. 
 
As regards the short run analysis of the zero lower bound, different approaches have 
culminated in the New Keynesian synthesis14, which can be regarded as a symbiosis of 
Neo Classical and Keynesian thoughts. New Keynesian models introduce nominal price 
and/or wage rigidities in a dynamic stochastic real business cycle framework. It took a 
long time until serious consideration was given to the zero lower bound for nominal 
interest rates in this framework. Summers (1991) and Fischer (1994) have revived this 
old concern. Since then, Fuhrer and Madigan (1997), Krugman (1998), Orphanides and 
Wieland (1998), Svensson (2000, 2001), Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999, 2000) and 
Wolman (1998) have studied the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap in a New 
Keynesian framework. Although this framework has important limitations when 
analysing the zero lower bound, it has proven to be a helpful workhorse to study certain 
aspects of this issue. I take it as a starting point and discuss its limitations and possible 
extensions along the way. Following Smets (2000) and Viñals (2001), a highly stylised 
New Keynesian macroeconomic model can be specified as follows (equations (1-4)): 
                                                           
13  Compare McCallum (1983) for a formal analysis. 
14  The New Keynesian literature is surveyed in Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida, 
Galí and Gertler (1999). 
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ty (in logs) is the percentage deviation of output from its steady state trend level in 
period t, ti  the nominal interest rate, tr  the ex ante real interest rate, and tπ  the 
inflation rate. ty,ε  and t,πε  are the (serially uncorrelated zero-mean) stochastic 
components of equations (1) and (2), representing demand and inflation disturbances 
respectively. 1+tt xE  is the expected value at period t of variable x in period t+1; 
ωσρ ,,y and λ are parameters. Equation (1) is a representation of the demand side of the 
economy. Equation (2) is a Phillips curve, representing the supply side. With yρ  and ω  
equal to zero, Goodfriend and King (1997) have demonstrated that these equations can 
be derived from micro foundations. However, equations (1) and (2) consist of both 
forward and backward looking components in order to describe the inflation dynamics 
in industrialised economies satisfactory (Smets (2000)). Equation (3) describes the 
Fisher-relation between (ex ante) real and nominal interest rates. By definition, the zero 
lower bound is binding when the sum of the real rate of interest and the rate of expected 
inflation is zero. Nominal interest rates cannot go negative. For in that case, the zero 
rate of return on cash would dominate the rate of return on other assets, which is ruled 
out a priori. The model does not distinguish between short- and long-term interest 
rates.15 Perfect substitutability is assumed between non-monetary assets. Finally, 
equation (4) is the Taylor type rule that describes the interest rate reaction function. The 
nominal interest rate is increased when current inflation exceeds its target (assumed to 
be zero) or when the output gap is positive. Equation (4) may require that the monetary 
authority set a negative real interest rate, which may be impeded by low or even 
negative expected rates of inflation. Then, the zero lower bound will be binding, and the 
economy will be in a liquidity trap in the absence of other transmission mechanisms 
than the nominal interest rate. 
An economy with a low average real interest rate over the business cycle is in a more 
vulnerable position concerning the risk of drifting into a situation with a binding zero 
lower bound than an economy with a higher average real interest rate. Usually, 
however, an economic shock is necessary to trigger a sudden decline in the steady state 
                                                           
15  For ease of exposition, the model ignores term and risk premia. The incorporation of risk 
premia would add a spread to the interest rate in equation (1), and would lift the lower 
bound to the nominal interest rate. In general, risk premia are increasing with the level of 
interest rates. If there would still be a risk premium with the riskless nominal interest rate 
at its lower bound - which seems likely - the incorporation of risk premia in the model 
would make a binding lower bound more likely. 
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real interest rates and/or the rate of expected inflation (e.g. Orphanides and Wieland 
(1998)). I discuss several kinds of shocks that can hit the economy.  
 
First, a downward cost-push shock can trigger a binding zero lower bound. Examples 
are a downward shock in oil prices or increased competition. Such a shock implies a 
significant negative value of t,πε in equation (2). The direct effect is lower inflation in 
period t. As a result, the nominal interest rate will be decreased (equation (4)), moving 
in the direction of the zero lower bound. The ex ante real interest rate will decrease too, 
causing some counterbalancing upward pressure on inflation through ty . In general, a 
downward cost-push shock is favourable, supporting output but reducing inflationary 
pressures.16 Only if there is very strong initial downward pressure on inflation, there is a 
severe risk that the zero lower bound will be hit.  
 
Second, a downward demand shock, ty,ε < 0 in equation (1), putting downward pressure 
on both output and inflation, can cause a binding zero lower bound. The output gap will 
fall first (equation (1)), resulting in lower inflation in the same period (equation (2)). 
Both effects are translated into a lower nominal interest rate (equation (4)), bringing 
closer a binding zero lower bound. A demand shock may originate from a collapse in 
aggregate demand, e.g. following a sudden lack of confidence. Contrary to the situation 
after a downward supply shock, both the output gap and inflation pressure have similar 
effects on the nominal interest rate. Therefore, this is potentially a more severe 
situation. Budgetary contraction offers an example of a negative demand shock that 
lowers real interest rates and can fuel deflationary expectations, as was the case in the 
US in the late 1920s/early 1930s. 
 
Third, in an open economy, a sudden large expected appreciation can cause a binding 
zero lower bound (McKinnon and Ohno (2000)). To illustrate this, the model can be 
extended to include interactions with the outside world. I assume Uncovered Interest 
Parity (UIP), which can be stated as: 
( )ttttt ssEii −+= +1*)5(  
*
ti  is the foreign nominal rate of interest. 1+tt sE  is the expected nominal exchange rate 
of the foreign currency expressed in units of the domestic currency for period t+1. So, 
an increase in s means a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency. In real terms, 
UIP can be written as: 
( )ttttt qqErr −+= +1*)6(  
                                                           
16  E.g. continued price cuts in the computer industry in the 1980s and 1990s associated 
with technical progress have not undermined investment in this sector, because 
productivity gains have more than offset the price effect. Other sectors of the economy 
have clearly benefited from lower computer prices. 
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q is the real exchange rate ( ttt PPs * ), where the domestic price level P is assumed to be 
temporarily fixed; the foreign price level *P  is treated as given, because it is beyond the 
influence of the domestic monetary authority. The central bank can influence q via 
foreign currency interventions that alter s. I restate the model (equations (1-4)) in an 
open economy context as follows (equations (7-10)): 
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1
* ,αρ y and 2α are parameters. In equation (7), **yρ  represents foreign export demand
17; ( )ttt qqE −+11α  is an expression for changes in competitiveness. In equation (8) the term ( )ttt qqE −+12α  is added to include the effects of expected costs of imported 
intermediaries. Equation (9) follows from equation (6). With a large expected real 
appreciation, the direct effect on the inflation rate will be downward (equation (8))18, 
bringing closer a binding zero lower bound (equation (10)). There is also an indirect 
downward effect on inflation via a lower output gap (equation (7)). Exchange rate 
arrangements that cause substantial real appreciation can turn out to be problematic in 
this respect. Keynes (1923) was well aware of the international propagation of 
deflationary pressures through the fixed nominal exchange rates of the gold standard, 
which limited the scope for domestic policy actions in an international environment 
with free capital movement (incompatible triangle). In the 1980s, the Plaza and Louvre 
agreements set similar mechanisms in motion, with negative effects on Japan (Siebert 
(2000)). The international movement towards stable and low inflation rates (section 1) 
has reduced the risk of the emergence of a sudden large expected appreciation in today’s 
advanced economies. 
 
Economic shocks are most devastating when they lead to persistent deflationary 
expectations, lifting real interest rates, and set in motion a chain of events that lead to 
stagnation, i.e. a deflationary spiral (Krugman (1999a)). Persistent deflationary 
expectations can stem from prevailing adaptive expectations (high value of ω  in the 
model). They can also stem from price and/or wage stickiness (e.g. DeLong and 
Summers (1986)). The implied slowness of price reductions can fuel (rational) 
                                                           
17  In an open economy, net additional demand via net exports reduces the risk of very low 
ex ante real interest rates. 
18  In the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS (fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates), higher inflation of an ERM country relative to inflation in Germany (the anchor 
country) caused a loss of competitiveness (real appreciation), mitigating inflationary 
pressures. 
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expectations of still further price reductions ( 1+ttE π  lower). Fisher
19 (1933), Tobin 
(1975, 1980), Minsky (1982), King (1994) and Bernanke (1995) have emphasised that 
high nominal indebtedness will make a deflationary spiral more likely to occur due to 
the heterogeneous nature of economic agents. More specifically, debtors, who spend a 
higher proportion of their income than creditors, get into trouble by deflation since their 
real income declines substantially. So, even if net debt is modest (with debtors and 
creditors offsetting each other), debt distribution is relevant. High nominal indebtedness 
can arise during an asset price bubble (Minsky (1982), Wolfson (1996)). When the 
bubble collapses, the debt may turn out to be unbearable, especially in a deflationary 
climate. An alternative propagation mechanism concerns the collateral value associated 
with the debt. Deflation will erode the collateral value. As a result the cost of capital 
will increase, subsequently decreasing investment demand (Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989)). A vicious circle can develop, with falling asset prices, rising real debt levels, 
lower aggregate demand, consumer price deflation and downward spiralling 
expectations. Note that a deflationary spiral is not the mirror image of an inflationary 
spiral. In the latter case, the monetary authority can stabilise the economy by raising the 
real rate of interest via an increase in nominal rates (assuming nominal price and/or 
wage rigidities). However, in a deflationary environment, the monetary authority will 
not be able to lower real rates below a certain level, due to the lower bound on nominal 
interest rates. 
 
Usually, the risk of a binding zero lower bound is regarded as limited. According to 
Orphanides and Wieland (1998), the risk of hitting the zero bound would be negligible 
for the US with an average nominal interest rate over the cycle of 3%. To get this result, 
they use stochastic simulations of a small structural rational expectations model. They 
suppose stochastic shocks similar in magnitude to those over the 1980s and 1990s. Only 
with a lower level of the average nominal interest rate, they found a significant risk of a 
binding zero bound. Using a similar model, Viñals (2001) has compared the US and the 
euro area chance of hitting the zero lower bound. His findings for the US are more or 
less in line with those of Orphanides and Wieland (1998). For the euro area, his results 
suggest an even smaller chance than for the US of hitting the zero lower bound due to 
the structural characteristics of the euro area. However, finding that shocks that cause a 
binding zero lower bound are unlikely, does not rule them out altogether. The 
probability of a binding zero lower bound depends on the likelihood of a combination of 
extreme shocks. Since the frequency of such shocks is limited, they are hard to assess 
econometrically (King (1999)).20 Typically, in a financial crisis, several different shocks 
can reinforce themselves. Mishkin (1991, 1996) defines a financial crisis as “a 
disruption to financial markets that sharply and severely increases asymmetric 
                                                           
19  Fisher’s debt-deflation theory is clearly analysed in Dimand (1999). 
20  Amirault and O’Reilly (2001) warn that relying on historical data to determine the risk of 
hitting the zero lower bound may underestimate this risk due to the recent world-wide 
tendency towards regimes with low average levels of inflation. 
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information […] so that financial markets are no longer able to efficiently channel funds 
to those who have the most productive investment opportunities”. He has found that 
most financial crises in the US started with a combination of shocks, including a sharp 
increase in interest rates, a stock market crash, and a sharp increase in uncertainty due to 
economic recession. In addition, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 
11 September 2001 offer an example of a rare combination of shocks. Lower demand as 
a result of the virtual stand-still of the US economy for several days, falling asset prices, 
together with strong negative confidence effects, can potentially trigger a binding zero 
lower bound. 
 
 
3. Different Views on the Zero Lower Bound: An Appraisal 
 
Four main strands of the literature can be distinguished to discuss the zero lower bound. 
First, Krugman and his followers have emphasised the importance of lifting expected 
inflation to lower the market real interest rate at the zero lower bound. Second, Meltzer 
and other Monetarist authors have argued that transmission mechanisms other than the 
nominal interest rate will be effective at the zero lower bound. Third, Buiter and 
Panigirtzoglou as well as Goodfriend have proposed to introduce so-called Gesell 
money. As explained by Goodfriend (2000), Gesell money is a carry tax on money (both 
currency and bank reserves) to circumvent the interest rate floor. Fourth, Svensson has 
tried to combine several other approaches, and claims to have found a ‘foolproof’ way 
to escape from the liquidity trap. These different approaches are discussed below in the 
context of the consensus model. Meanwhile, it is important to keep in mind that Japan 
has been struggling for many years with a binding zero lower bound. This may indicate 
that the theories put forward are incomplete, although it is fair to say that this 
proposition does not follow from the Japanese example per se, as a referee has correctly 
pointed out. From the perspective that the available theories seem incomplete, this 
section also evaluates the limitations of the main strands in the literature. 
 
3.1 Krugman’s view 
 
Several years before Krugman (1998), Summers (1991) had emphasised that a (very) 
low level of average inflation and low inflationary expectations will imply (very) low 
average short-term nominal interest rates. If the monetary strategy leads to inflationary 
expectations close to or below zero, this will make the emergence of a binding zero 
lower bound more likely. Krugman (1998) has triggered a discussion on Japanese 
monetary policies. In his analysis, lifting expected inflation is the way forward for Japan 
and other economies struggling with a binding zero lower bound. He makes a strong 
case for the announcement of an inflation target in a deflationary environment in order 
to guard inflationary expectations. Then, lifting expected inflation (equation (3)) can 
reduce the ex ante real interest rate, which is the interest rate decisive for economic 
performance (equation (1)).  
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According to, among others, Svensson (2000) and Smets (2000), price level targeting 
might be a better way to anchor expectations than an inflation target. This is because, in 
contrast to an inflation targeting regime, undershooting of the price level target in 
period t leads to inflationary expectations in period t+1. Berg and Jonung (1999) 
describe how Sweden dropped the gold standard in 1931 and adopted an explicit price 
level target. It turned out that price level targeting was a successful way for Sweden to 
stop deflationary expectations and mitigate the output decline. The potentially better 
performance of price level targeting as compared to inflation targeting is subject to the 
confidence of the general public and financial markets in the monetary authority’s 
ability to reflate the economy.21 In this respect, the public can be expected to be more 
confident if the central bank has at its disposal instruments with which it can create 
future inflation directly. 
 
In addition to the long term orientation of monetary policy, monetary tactics (i.e. the 
way in which monetary policy is executed on a short-term basis) may also matter. 
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) have argued that if the central bank follows a 
Taylor-type rule and targets a (close to) zero inflation rate, the rule can be modified 
slightly to reduce dramatically the detrimental effects of the zero lower bound. In their 
paper, one possible modification with promising results is to lower the nominal 
monetary policy rate pre-emptively if a binding zero bound is expected. This would 
involve a higher value for πβ  in equation (4) if there were a serious threat of a binding 
zero bound in the near future. The suggested policy reaction is in line with what several 
authors (e.g. Mundell (2000)) have concluded on Fed policies in the late 1920s. With 
hindsight, they have stated that the Fed should have lowered nominal interest rates 
sooner and more forcefully and should have injected reserves via its lender of last 
resort-function. Then, the Fed might have been in a position to prevent the rapid decline 
in broad money and the collapse of the banking sector. The deflation of the Great 
Depression would probably have been more modest, or even avoided.  
 
Krugman launched his ideas in order to influence Japanese policies at the end of the 
1990s. The Japanese authorities and others have been very sceptical about his recipes. 
In their view, the Bank of Japan cannot explicitly show how to achieve the desired 
inflation level. They fear following Krugman’s advice would result in a loss of 
credibility (Okina (1999)). Whereas Krugman acknowledges that creating inflationary 
expectations might be difficult, especially when the public is convinced of the central 
bank’s commitment to price stability, Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999) regard this 
virtually impossible. In their words “targeting a higher rate of inflation after you are 
caught in the trap would be like pushing toothpaste back into the tube”. The problem is 
that Krugman’s recipe is conditional on the central bank’s ability to increase expected 
                                                           
21  Batani and Yates (2001) have shown that the probability of hitting the zero lower bound 
under the alternative regimes is model specific. 
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inflation.22 In reality, the central bank has no instruments available to force higher 
expected inflation. It might also be difficult to raise inflationary expectations because 
price stickiness can make the expected future price also sticky (Fuhrer and Madigan 
(1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (1998)). Krugman’s ideas fit in the literature on 
time-inconsistency and credibility by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon 
(1983) and their followers that credible central bank commitment to price stability can 
anchor expected inflation at a low and stable level. If his recipe works, it is important to 
avoid that creating higher inflationary expectations paves the way for a future 
inflationary spiral, which would be suboptimal from a microeconomic perspective. 
Therefore, it is crucial to base monetary policies on a nominal anchor provided by the 
medium term monetary policy strategy (Taylor (2001)). In so doing, the monetary 
policy strategy helps in reducing uncertainty about the future. Similarly, Svensson 
(2000) argues that the mere announcement of an inflation target is not likely to be 
enough to fuel inflationary expectations. Instead, it would be necessary to set up an 
inflation-targeting framework, including transparent inflation reports and published 
inflation forecasts among other things. In the words of Blinder (1998), it is about 
“words matching deeds”. All in all, it seems unlikely that the exact set-up of the 
monetary policy strategy is essential for its success in solving the zero lower bound 
problem. What matters, is that it helps anchoring medium term inflationary 
expectations. But if a central bank is initially lacking credibility, it is unlikely that it is 
able to commit itself credibly to higher inflation. 
 
3.2 Meltzer’s Monetarist view 
 
Monetarists argue that the monetary transmission channel23 is much more complicated 
than is incorporated in equation (1). The Monetarist view differs from the consensus 
model in so far that monetary easing will still be successful with short-term interest 
rates at the lower bound because of other transmission channels (e.g. Mishkin (1996)). 
Meltzer (1963, 1995, 1999) and Brunner and Meltzer (1968) focus on the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy working through relative price adjustments of non-
monetary assets that are imperfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios. These relative 
price changes are transmitted along the yield curve and also impact on the exchange 
rate.24 Meltzer’s reasoning is based on the assumption that when the short-term nominal 
interest rate cannot fall due to the zero lower bound, yields on non-monetary assets are 
                                                           
22  Wolman (1998) models an economy in which the monetary authority can always create 
inflationary expectations. Not surprisingly, in this case a policy regime where nominal 
interest rates are occasionally bounded by the interest rate floor generates higher welfare 
than a regime that always avoids nominal rates at zero. 
23  Walsh (1998) presents a useful overview of monetary transmission channels and 
empirical evidence of their importance in Chapter 7. 
24  In this paper, the monetary policy channel that works through foreign exchange markets 
is discussed in the context of Svensson’s eclectic view. 
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not necessarily at their lower bounds.25 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have emphasised 
the credit channel in the monetary policy transmission process. This channel is not 
hampered by the lower zero bound on nominal interest rates. Monetary easing will 
reduce the exposure by debtors to the wedge between the cost of external and internal 
funds. This will support current spending. 
 
The Pigou effect can be seen as an abstraction of ‘alternative’ transmission channels 
that do not work through the nominal interest rate. To see this, the model (1-4) can be 
extended as follows (11-15): 
 
 
tm  (in logs) is the percentage deviation from steady state of the nominal value of the 
real money demand (i.e. nominal amount of money divided by the price level, tt PM ); 
10 ,γγ  and 2γ  are coefficients; tm,ε  is an error term. Notice that the endogenous 
variables ty and ti  are determined by equations (11-14). Therefore, equation (15) 
merely describes which amount of money is necessary to implement the policy rule 
(equation (14)). The parameters my,ρ and mω  have been added. The Pigou effect is 
incorporated in equation (11) through tm . With output below potential, real balances 
will increase until the price level and output are back in equilibrium. Ireland (2001a) has 
shown that the cross-equation restrictions require that real balances can be included in 
the demand function if and only if they are also contained in the supply function. As 
before, there is only one instrument variable. It is useful to regard tm  as the instrument 
variable, since lifting the real amount of money can boost output and inflation, even if 
the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound.  
 
Does it make sense to add the Pigou effect to the short-term consensus model? At first 
sight, the Pigou effect seems at odds with the micro foundations of the consensus 
model, which is a representative agent model. Money is not perceived as net wealth in 
this kind of models, since wealth cannot be transferred across individuals. However, if 
the assumption of homogenous agents is relaxed, for instance by differentiating between 
                                                           
25  In practice, monetary easing with the short-term interest rate at the zero lower bound 
might involve additional open-market transactions in other assets, such as commercial 
paper. Since late 1995, the Bank of Japan is implementing repurchasing agreements 
using commercial paper. In 1998, the Bank of Japan held circa one-third of the 
outstanding commercial paper stock. Transactions in longer-term debt, equity or property 
are also conceivable. 
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different generations, money becomes net wealth (Ireland (2001b)). In the Monetarist 
approach, the Pigou or real balance effect is incorporated in a short-run model. This is 
done to emphasise the role of monetary factors in the monetary policy transmission 
process. An increase in tM  is assumed to have real effects at short notice. In the 
consensus model, real balances ( )tt PM  only have long-run effects via the gradual real 
increase of real balances via deflation.26  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the Monetarist assertion that monetary transmission 
channels other than via nominal interest rates can prevent a liquidity trap is conditional 
on the assumption that the marginal utility of money eventually becomes zero as real 
balances expand.27 However, if liquidity preference as defined in section 2 is assumed, 
the demand for money will asymptote to infinity as the interest rate asymptotes to zero. 
On mature financial markets, this can be thought of as a high preference by market 
participants for liquid assets. Monetary policy would then have no effect on total 
demand, because hoarding would absorb any additional money created. Money then 
becomes “a bottomless sink for purchasing power”. The consensus model takes on 
board liquidity preference in so far that there is no explicit Pigou effect. 
 
From a more practical point of view, an important caveat concerning alternative 
monetary transmission mechanisms in a zero lower bound environment is that empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of these channels in such a context is lacking. For 
instance, Clouse et al. (1999) have investigated which theoretical options are available 
for the Fed for stimulating aggregate demand by increasing monetary supply after the 
short-term interest rate has reached zero. They concluded that the Fed has a wide range 
of policy responses at its disposal, but they did not find convincing evidence of 
substantial quantitative effects. The most far-reaching policy option along these lines is 
allowing companies and individuals lending directly from the central bank on a massive 
scale. However, if the central bank is purchasing lower rated private sector securities, it 
will take substantial credit risks on its balance sheet. This can backfire on its credibility. 
Because of this risk, central bank legislation usually rules out this kind of transactions. 
 
3.3 Buiter’s and Goodfriend’s view: Abolition of the zero bound 
 
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2000) and Goodfriend (2000) have suggested the 
introduction of so-called Gesell money.28 This would imply decreasing the zero nominal 
interest floor by taxing money (and other monetary liabilities on the central bank 
balance sheet). In terms of our model, the restriction that nominal interest rates cannot 
                                                           
26  See the discussion of Pigou (1943, 1947) in section 2. 
27  Preferences for money balances would then exhibit satiation and money creation would 
ultimately be translated in demand for other assets and spending. 
28  Fisher (1932) and Keynes (1936) have hinted at this idea in the 1930s. 
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go negative is circumvented. With Gesell money it will always be possible to reduce the 
interest rate floor, even below zero.  
 
The possible success of Gesell money is conditional on the availability of technologies 
that make it feasible without high costs. This is questionable in practice. The 
introduction of Gesell money will bring about high transaction and administrative costs, 
reducing its liquidity and thereby the main advantage of money (see Brunner (1971)). 
Moreover, the replacement of conventional money by Gesell money would make 
currency less attractive as compared to today’s alternatives, such as foreign currency 
and e-money, assuming that e-money is not subject to the same tax (Gresham’s law). 
This could impair the central banks monetary policy effectiveness, as explained by 
Friedman (1999).  
 
3.4 Svensson’s eclectic view with an important role for exchange rate policies 
 
In line with Monetarist reasoning about different transmission channels of monetary 
policy, some authors have stressed the exchange rate channel in a zero lower bound 
situation. 
A medium term strategy to devaluate/depreciate the currency (an increase in 1+tt sE in 
the model embodied in equations (7-10) can increase inflationary expectations. This 
strategy is only applicable to relatively open economies. It is assumed that the targeted 
country is not in a zero lower bound situation. Johnson et al. (1999) show that – 
assuming UIP holds – foreign exchange interventions at the lower bound can only have 
direct effects if they signal future further depreciation, or if domestic and foreign assets 
are imperfect substitutes. Both channels can be expected to be of minor importance, as 
is well known from the literature on foreign exchange intervention (Edison (1993), 
Eijffinger (1999)). 
 
McCallum (2000) drops the UIP assumption explicitly.29 In his model, the exchange 
rate replaces the short-term nominal interest rate as the monetary policy instrument. The 
central bank can determine real exchange rates via its control over nominal exchange 
rates, as is the case in our model (7-10). In the absence of UIP, McCallum is able to 
show that monetary stabilisation policy can still be effective via foreign exchange 
markets.30 In line with McCallum, McKinnon and Ohno (2000) argue that if deflation is 
                                                           
29  Empirical research tends to suggest that exchange rate movements are inconsistent with 
UIP (e.g. Froot and Thaler (1990) and Lewis (1995)).   
30  Meltzer (1999) is of the same opinion, stating “Suppose that with its short-term interest 
rate at zero, the Bank of Japan announces that it wants the dollar exchange rate to fall by 
25 percent and that it is prepared to print yen to buy dollars until that occurs. Does 
anyone doubt that the yen would depreciate or that the depreciation would affect 
spending, output and prices in Japan?” McCallum’s arguments can be interpreted as a 
special case in Meltzer’s rejection of the liquidity trap framework. 
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caused by expectations of appreciation of the domestic currency, the forward rate of the 
exchange rate should be brought down, e.g. by international exchange rate agreements. 
Elaborating on these ideas, Svensson (2000, 2001) indicates that exchange rate pegging, 
involving a commitment to arbitrary large non-sterilised foreign exchange interventions, 
might play an important role. Since this strategy would involve putting into circulation 
domestic currency and buying foreign reserves, the central bank cannot run out of 
reserves. He drops UIP for his short-term analysis by assuming a sticky domestic price 
level, so that the real exchange rate can be influenced in the short run. In Svensson 
(2001), he has presented a very transparent model to explain his ideas. He claims to 
have found a ‘foolproof’ way for an open economy to escape from the binding zero 
lower bound. The idea is to jump-start the economy by a real depreciation of the 
currency via unlimited interventions and in so doing increase inflationary expectations. 
Initially, an exchange rate peg is established, which is later replaced by a price-level or 
inflation target when the price-level target has been reached. In so doing the risk of 
overheating is avoided.  
 
A problem with Svensson’s ‘foolproof’ solution is that the expected real exchange rate 
depreciation in the initial phase will raise real interest rates with limited maturities 
relative to world real interest rates (Swank (2001)). This will counteract the exchange 
rate mechanism. If the real interest mechanism dominates, the inflation rate will not rise 
initially. A persistent low or negative inflation rate can undermine the credibility of the 
monetary authority and puts at risk the strategy as a whole. A practical problem is that 
the central bank cannot steer the exchange rate as it can steer interest rates. In the 
specific Japanese context, a problem is the relatively closed nature of the Japanese 
economy. Thus, very large exchange rate changes would be needed. Another practical 
obstacle to putting exchange rate targeting in place is that generally governments are in 
charge of exchange rate policies, not the central bank. This can make it difficult to 
pursue exchange rate policies as an integral part of the monetary policy strategy. 
Finally, such a large and persistent depreciation can significantly affect the economies 
of trading partners, which might give rise to retaliation measures. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
What brings the suggested solutions to a binding zero lower bound together is their 
mechanical character. However, it is not certain that a solution that works in a specific 
economic model will also work in reality. Besides, all suggested solutions will in one 
way or another involve costs. These two considerations may explain why the Japanese 
authorities have so far not followed the non-orthodox recipes put forward. 
 
A factor not incorporated in the models discussed is the general level of confidence. 
Using the concept of liquidity preference, Keynes has shown that lack of confidence is a 
crucial element of persistent zero lower bounds. In the current literature, the 
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precondition that a high degree of confidence must be in place to escape from a binding 
zero lower bound is undervalued. Policies to increase the expected rate of inflation can 
only be effective if monetary policy is credible, or if a framework is introduced that 
makes it credible. This is only feasible in an environment in which the central bank can 
create inflation. This implies that confidence must be in place. Otherwise, economic 
agents would increase their hoarding after monetary easing. Alternative monetary 
transmission channels, which feature prominently in Monetarist thinking, will only be 
effective if economic agents spend more after monetary easing, i.e. if they have 
confidence in the future. Then, economic agents will have no incentive for excessive 
hoarding. On the other hand, if confidence is lacking, the situation may arise that 
economic agents are characterised by liquidity preference, and do not increase spending 
after monetary easing. As discussed, Gesell money can only be expected to offer an 
effective escape route from a binding zero lower bound under strict conditions. 
However, it may help in restoring confidence by supporting nominal interest change 
effectiveness. As regards Svensson’s (2001) promising approach offering a ‘foolproof’ 
way of escaping from a binding zero lower bound, it must be noticed that his solution 
works only in the specific context of his model. Because the central bank can devaluate 
the exchange rate of the domestic currency without limit, its policies will be credible. In 
practice, the economy is much more complicated than the stylised model suggests. E.g. 
a central bank cannot steer the exchange rate precisely, as assumed in his model. Hence, 
it is impossible to prove that a certain solution to the zero lower bound will work always 
and everywhere. Without ‘foolproof’ solutions to the zero lower bound, restoring 
confidence will be of paramount importance to steer the economic agents towards 
spending more. 
 
As long as confidence remains firmly in place, an economy may hit the zero lower 
bound due to particular circumstances, but this situation will not cause severe output 
losses. The Swiss case in the late 1970s offers an example. In such an environment, 
monetary policy with nominal interest rates at the lower bound can be expected to be 
effective. Unless confidence is restored, monetary policy cannot help in escaping from 
the zero lower bound. With monetary policy impotent, the economy is in a liquidity 
trap. Japan is currently in such a dreadful situation. 
 
So, if there is a persistent zero lower bound and monetary policy is ineffective, the lack 
of confidence may be the main challenge. Here, demand and supply factors meet. The 
zero lower bound problem is usually seen as a demand side phenomenon. As the 
Japanese example shows, a binding zero lower bound can persist much longer than 
usual demand side problems, suggesting that confidence and supply factors also play a 
role. A lack of confidence can undermine demand for a considerable span of time. The 
clearest example of a joint supply and demand shock is a financial stability crisis. By 
definition, such a shock implies that financial market intermediation is interrupted 
(supply side effect). This will go hand in hand with lower demand, since business 
activity is severely hampered. The mechanism works also the other way around. In 
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terms of the illustrative model (equations (1-4)), an increase in the degree of confidence 
will manifest itself in lifting potential output and the output gap (y), as well as the 
average ex ante real interest rate over the business cycle. The average ex ante interest 
rate is exogenous in the model, since it is specified in deviations from the steady state. 
With favourable economic prospects, profit prospects will be high, as will investors’ 
propensity to invest. Also, consumers’ propensity to save will be low because future 
income prospects are advantageous. In general terms, good governance (adherence to 
the rule of law, well-defined property rights, financial sector stability, flexible markets) 
creates an environment in which the economy can flourish, and steady state real interest 
rates will ceteris paribus be higher than without. What can government policies do to 
bring about such a situation?  
 
In general terms, it is important that economic agents are confident that political leaders 
and economic and monetary policy makers are capable of their duties. If they lack 
public confidence, people that are trusted should replace them. The policy makers must 
pursue policies that restore confidence in economic prospects. As regards monetary 
policy, the monetary policy strategy is important for anchoring inflationary 
expectations. Actual policy decisions must show that the monetary authority acts 
according to its own words. Budgetary policies can be used to increase demand, and in 
so doing try to kick-start the economy. This will lift average ex ante real interest rates 
over the business cycle. The average real interest rate can rise partly through a direct 
expenditure channel. Expansionary fiscal policy will bring unemployed labour and 
capital into use, boosting output and tax revenues. However, this channel is conditional 
on the absence of Ricardian equivalence. The arguments in favour of and against 
Ricardian equivalence are discussed in Bernheim (1987). It is essentially an empirical 
question. Barro’s (1989) findings suggest that partial Ricardian equivalence prevails.31 
Apart from the Ricardian equivalence argument, the government may not be in a 
position to borrow because of a mounting public debt32, a loss of credibility or Stability 
and Growth Pact-like constraints on government borrowing (Buiter and Panigirtzoglou 
(2000)). Government expenditure can also raise the average ex ante real interest rate 
through an indirect confidence channel by revitalising economic prospects. Budgetary 
policies can support structural policies, for instance in financing the writing off of 
                                                           
31  Ricardian equivalence does not play an explicit role in the models presented. 
32  With the debt to GDP ratio clearly above 100%, Japan may reach a point where the 
government’s creditworthiness is so impaired that it is no longer in a position to borrow. 
A large debt may raise questions about government solvency in the long run in spite of a 
zero interest rate, because this situation will not last forever. 
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possible bad-loans. In this context, quality of government expenditure is important.33 
Structural change can offer a lasting channel to raise the average ex ante real interest 
rate. Of course, the direct effects of structural policies can take many years before they 
bear fruit. But in the short-term they can help in the reestablishment of confidence by 
improving the long-term prospects for the economy. From a longer-term perspective, 
what matters is that the economic structure determines to a large extent in what context 
macroeconomic demand policies work. In a zero lower bound environment, this regards 
above all trend productivity growth. The key insight is that higher productivity growth 
can lift low (average) ex ante real interest rates. Higher real interest rates can be 
achieved via a higher ‘natural’ rate of growth (summing the growth of the labour force 
and the rate of technical progress).34 A higher natural rate of growth can result from 
exogenous factors, such as the emergence of a ‘New Economy’ (see e.g. Buiter (2000)), 
or good structural policies. It is basically about a mixture of credible policies that 
restore confidence by setting up sound old age pension systems, disability schemes and 
the like, and promote competition by reducing trade barriers, pursuing microeconomic 
deregulation and similar policies. Safeguarding financial sector stability is also a key 
element of these structural policies, since an advanced market economy cannot function 
without efficient and effective credit intermediation.35 In sum, it is unlikely that an 
economy with robust institutions and confidence firmly in place, such as the US36, will 
end up in a situation with a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Of 
course, at the end of 2001, the Fed funds rate was reduced to the low level of 1.75%. 
But this must be seen against the background of sharp downward demand and 
confidence shocks (terrorist attacks, confidence fall in ICT sector), and a synchronised 
international cyclical downturn. As Fed chairman Greenspan has said at several 
occasions, the long-run economic prospects of the US economy remain favourable after 
the tragic events of September 11, 2001 (Greenspan (2001, 2002)). Enhanced 
productivity growth is expected to lift the US standard of living. In particular, 
Greenspan has stressed the health of the financial sector, which is in sharp contrast to 
                                                           
33  In contrast to popular belief, Keynes (1936) did care about the quality of public 
expenditure. He preferred productive public expenditure to ‘wasteful’ expenditure. He 
departed from classical economics only when he stated that - in absence of productive 
possibilities for public expenditure - also ‘wasteful’ expenditure such as pyramid-
building will enrich the community on balance when the economy is characterised by 
involuntary unemployment. 
34  In the 1950s and early 1960s inflation in the US varied between approximately 0 and 
4%, but the zero bound was never reached. This is because productivity growth and 
average economic growth were high, and therefore also the equilibrium real interest rate 
and the short-term policy rate of interest.   
35  Viñals (2001) discusses the interactions between financial and monetary stability in a 
low inflation environment. 
36  At the end of 2001, the Fed funds rate was reduced to 1.75%. This must be seen against 
the background of sharp downward demand and confidence shocks (terrorist attacks, 
confidence fall in ICT sector), and a synchronised international cyclical downturn. 
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the Japanese situation. If an economy with a sound underlying structure would 
nevertheless hit the zero lower bound, an optimistic reassessment of expectations for 
economic growth by the public at large, and financial market participants in particular, 
will be crucial for escaping from it. 
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